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Abstract 
South Africa’s principal corporate governance report aspires to an ‘inclusive’ approach to 
corporate governance, in which companies are clearly advised to consider the interests of a 
variety of stakeholders. Yet, in common with many other countries, there is little discussion of 
the theoretical foundations and assumptions implicit in the recommended approach to corporate 
governance. The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of corporate governance and the 
corporate environment in South Africa in terms of existing theory and models of corporate 
governance, and to provide a critique based on a consideration of traditional African values and 
the socio-economic necessities of post-apartheid South Africa. The result is the identification of 
an incompatibility between the current corporate environment in South Africa and the given 
exposition of African values. Some prospects for change are then identified. 
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It has been observed that there is little real consideration of the theories underlying the different 
approaches taken to corporate governance, and of the assumptions that the varying approaches 
entail (e.g. Letza et al., 2004). Just as governance in the political arena faces differing challenges 
and necessities in differing social and economic settings, it is expected that corporate governance 
would equally have to adapt in differing environments. South Africa has in the past been seen as 
a useful case study for investigations into racism and political change, yet with characteristics of 
both developed and developing countries it also provides opportunities for studies in corporate 
governance.  
 
The August 2003 issue of Internal Auditor carried an interview with the champion of corporate 
governance reform in South Africa, Mervyn King, and proclaimed that “South Africa has taken 
the lead in defining corporate governance in broadly inclusive terms” (Barrier, 2003). At the 
southern tip of the poorest continent, still dealing with vestiges of apartheid and colonialism, and 
yet at the same time maintaining a ‘first-world’ financial infrastructure and efficient capital 
market, any developments in corporate governance are bound to reflect competing economic and 
social interests. The result has been the advocacy of an ‘inclusive’ approach in corporate 
governance recommendations, principally the King reports issued in 1994 and 2002. 
 
The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis and critique of the corporate governance 
structures in place in South Africa, with particular reference to the theoretical underpinnings of 







MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The theory of corporate governance is frequently described in terms of two apparently opposing 
models: the shareholder and stakeholder models (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Goodpaster, 1991; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Turnbull, 1997; Letza et al., 2004). The differences between these 
two models reflect different theories of the corporation. The shareholder model holds the view 
that the corporation is an extension of its owners (the shareholders), it has the goal of providing 
goods or services to customers for the benefit of its owners, and that therefore it is required to be 
accountable and responsible towards its owners (Friedman, 1970). This view is dominant in the 
USA, and has become generally accepted in English-speaking countries. 
 
Within the shareholder model some commentators suggest further distinctions. Keasey et al. (in 
Letza et al., 2004) for instance subdivide the shareholder model into the typical principal-agent 
(or ‘finance’) model and the myopic market model, with the latter being more specifically 
concerned with the differences between managerial and shareholder interests over time horizons - 
the argument being that management favours short-term increases in market value over long-term 
benefits to shareholders.  
 
All variants of the shareholder model however maintain certain key assumptions. These include 
the fundamental right to individual private ownership and the belief that market forces will 
achieve economic efficiency. The right to individual private ownership lends itself to behaviour 
motivated by self-interest which then leads to the main problem in this model (according to its 
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advocates) - the conflicting interests of owners and managers. This conflict in the principal-agent 
relationship has led to the development of reforms and strategies that are aimed at harmonising 
the goals of the owners as principal and management as the agent. The solution to the problem is 
seen to lie in a combination of efficient contracting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the 
application of market forces in the managerial labour market (Fama, 1980). In line with these 
assumptions Letza et al. (2004, p.244) note that within the shareholder model corporate 
governance is “best addressed by removing restrictions on factor markets and the market in 
corporate control, together with strengthening the incentive system, … introducing a voluntary 
code and appointing non-executive directors.” 
 
In contrast, the stakeholder model is based on the view of the corporation as a social entity that 
has responsibility (and accountability) to a variety of stakeholders, in its widest sense including 
all those that may influence or are influenced by the corporation (Freeman and Reed, 1983), and 
usually encompassing owners, suppliers, customers, employees, management, government and 
local communities. Donaldson and Preston (1995) identify three aspects of stakeholder theory – 
descriptive, instrumental and normative, where descriptive theory presents the observation that 
organisations have stakeholders, where instrumental theory refers to the acknowledgement of 
responsibility towards stakeholders as a means to achieving greater economic efficiency, and 
where normative theory draws on moral and community values that require stakeholders be 
considered as an end in themselves. Goodpaster (1991) makes a similar distinction between a 
‘strategic stakeholder synthesis’ in which shareholders’ interests are considered insofar as they 
affect the corporation’s primary economic objective, and a ‘multi-fiduciary stakeholder analysis’ 
in which the interests of the various stakeholders (including shareholders) are treated as equally 
important. These distinctions within shareholder theory are far from trivial, as an instrumental 
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stakeholder theory that ultimately serves to improve the profitability of the corporation (for the 
benefit of the shareholders) is unlikely to find disfavour amongst shareholder theorists. The 
debate lies rather in the differences between the instrumental and normative versions of 
stakeholder theory, and whether or not the economic objectives of the corporation can, and 
should, be compromised.  
 
Corporate governance is also frequently categorised as either Anglo-American or European. 
Typically the Anglo-American approach tends towards the shareholder model whereas the 
European (and Japanese) approach tends towards the stakeholder model. Reed (2002) notes that 
developing countries by and large adopt corporate governance reforms in line with the Anglo-
American approach, which he considers to be characterised by the following (p.230): 
 
1. A single-tiered board structure which gives almost exclusive primacy to shareholder 
interests; 
2. A dominant role for financial markets; 
3. A correspondingly weak role for banks; and 
4. Little or no industrial policy involving firms cooperating with government agencies 
(and labour bodies). 
 
These characteristics correspond well with the assumptions underlying shareholder models of 
corporate governance, particularly the individual right to private ownership and the belief in the 
efficiency of the markets. Letza et al. (2004, p.251) however note that instrumental stakeholder 
theory is “attuned” to the Anglo-American model, and that “there has been a continuous shift of 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The history of South Africa includes several centuries of colonisation by Dutch and English 
settlers, followed by more than four decades of apartheid, all of which was characterised by 
continual conflict between settlers of European descent and indigenous Africans. By 1994, when 
the first non-racial democratic elections were held, South African society was consequently split 
along racial and economic lines. Unsurprisingly, the corporate landscape in South Africa reflects 
the centuries of colonialism and apartheid. Corporate law and corporate practice have been 
adopted mainly from the UK, and control over companies remains largely within the hands of the 
minority white population1. Applying Reed’s characteristics of the Anglo-American model 
outlined above, it is apparent that South Africa’s corporate structures fit this model. Firstly, a 
single-tiered board structure is standard, without any representation for stakeholders such as 
employees. Secondly, South Africa has an active stock exchange (the JSE Securities Exchange) 
which is rated as ‘advanced emerging’ by the FTSE (2004) Provisional Quality of Markets 
Criteria (the only factor preventing it being rated ‘developed’ is the GNI per capita figure for the 
country, which, it can be argued, is unrelated to the quality of the financial market). Rossouw et 
al. (2002, p.291), however, draw attention to the concentrated ownership of companies on the 
JSE securities exchange2 as well as the “subdued” growth in mergers and acquisitions activity. 
Despite these concerns, the prevailing attitude amongst business leaders and government is that a 
free market system must be upheld – in 1997 President Nelson Mandela declared that it would be 
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“impossible … to decide national economic policy without regard for the likely response of the 
markets” and two months later that the ruling African National Congress’ (ANC) market-led 
policies were the only path to sustainable development (in Marais, 2002, p.91). Thirdly, banks do 
not maintain control over South African companies and maintain arms-length relationships with 
clients (Rossouw et al., 2002, p.294). Lastly, in terms of industrial policy the evidence is less 
clear. The government has committed itself to the privatisation of state assets, and endeavours to 
promote competition in some industries (such as telecommunications) by issuing additional 
licenses; however there has been significant intervention in the labour market with the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998, aimed at rectifying racial imbalances in the workplace by 
requiring firms to adopt and implement affirmative action policies3, as well as the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, which is aimed at increasing ownership of South 
African companies by the ‘black’4 population5. These acts represent a significant intervention and 
reveal the ANC’s belief in the ability and efficiency of the market except when it comes to issues 
of ‘transformation’.  Nevertheless it is submitted that on the whole South Africa’s corporate 
structures correspond substantially with the Anglo-American model. 
 
Having considered the corporate environment it is necessary to examine the attempts at corporate 
governance reform in South Africa, and place these within a theoretical framework. Developing 
countries face a larger context when dealing with corporate governance in that they have to not 
only consider the issues of corporate collapse and creative accounting that have been the driving 
force behind corporate governance reforms in developed countries, but they must also consider 
the effects on economic development and of economic globalisation (Reed, 2002, p.223) and 
balance a locally acceptable and relevant corporate governance strategy with the need to meet 
international expectations. In this context, retired judge Mervyn King was appointed in 1994 to 
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form a commission to establish a code on corporate governance in South Africa. South Africa’s 
corporate governance reforms now centre around two reports - the King Report on Corporate 
Governance (King I) issued in November 1994 and the King Report on Corporate Governance 
for South Africa – 2002 (King II) issued in March 2002 (Institute of Directors, 2002).  The 
second report was commissioned partly as a result of changes in corporate governance 
worldwide, and after taking into account the political and economic uncertainty in the country 
which was prevalent when the first report was issued. Due to its currency, this paper will refer 
primarily to King II.   
 
King II begins with a quote by Sir Adrian Cadbury, responsible for the Cadbury reports on 
corporate governance in the UK, which refers to the goal of “align[ing] as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society”. In line with corporate governance reports 
worldwide, King II refers to the “four primary pillars of fairness, accountability, responsibility 
and transparency” (Introduction, para. 23). A review of the topics covered by King II and 
corporate governance reports issued in the UK (the Combined Code, the Turnbull Guidance, the 
Smith Guidance and the Higgs report) reveals that very similar issues are addressed. Topics dealt 
with include boards of directors, directors’ remuneration, internal control and risk management, 
and accounting and audit. The only area of significant difference is the section on Integrated 
Sustainability Reporting in King II for which there is no counterpart in the UK reports. 
 
Given the Anglo-American nature of the South African corporate environment, the ties that many 
businesses and business leaders have with other Anglophone countries and the fact that control 
over South African companies remains largely in the hands of white South Africans, one may 
initially expect the King reports to uphold a traditional shareholder model of corporate 
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governance. King II, however, describes its approach to corporate governance as ‘inclusive’. A 
review of the introduction to the report reveals that this is expressed through a number of related 
characteristics: 
 
 All stakeholders should be considered:  
 
“The inclusive approach recognises that stakeholders such as the community in which the 
company operates, its customers, its employees and its suppliers need to be considered when 
developing the strategy of a company” (para. 5.3) 
 
 Shareholders are to be considered as one of a number of stakeholders, albeit with their 
own particular interests:  
 
“The modern approach is for a board to identify the company’s stakeholders, including its 




“Because the shareowners have little or no protection, the quality of governance is of absolute 
importance to them” (para. 17.5) 
 
 Directors’ responsibilities lie to the company, not the shareholders:  
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“the so-called shareowner dominant theory … has been rejected by Courts in various jurisdictions 
… Consequently, directors, in exercising their fiduciary duties, must act in the interest of the 
company as a separate person” (para. 17.3) 
 
It is clear that the ‘inclusive’ approach adopted is really a form of stakeholder theory (a view 
supported by Rossouw, 2002). The section on Integrated Sustainability Reporting provides a 
detailed example of how stakeholder concerns are addressed in the body of the report: it includes 
recommendations for reporting on non-financial aspects of the business, including transformation 
progress (employment equity and black economic empowerment), human capital development 
policies, safety and health concerns (with particular reference to HIV/AIDS), as well as 
recommendations for the establishment of processes governing organisational ethics (through the 
use of codes of ethics), environmental impact and social investment policies.  All of these are 
clearly areas of significant concern to stakeholder groups such as employees, community groups 
and society at large. There are, however, a number of issues that can be raised which serve either 
to clarify or problematise this position: 
 
 
1. Responsibility or Accountability? 
 
Following the fiduciary duty that directors have to the corporation, the report states (Introduction, 
para. 5.1) that directors are “accountable” (in the sense that “one is liable to render an account”) 
to the company and “responsible” (in the sense that “one is liable to be called to account”) to 
relevant stakeholders. It goes on to state that “The stakeholder concept of being accountable to all 
legitimate stakeholders must be rejected for the simple reason that to ask boards to be 
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accountable to everyone would result in their being accountable to no one.” (Introduction, para. 
5.1). 
 
The logic behind this statement is unclear. No reason is given in the report as to why being 
accountable to all stakeholders would result in being accountable to no-one, and one could even 
suggest that the reference to a “simple reason” serves to discourage and deflect any serious 
consideration. This may still not present a problem if the reporting by directors is to the company 
itself, for the benefit of all stakeholders; however the traditional accounting paradigm of 
reporting to shareholders is maintained throughout the report, and no attempt is made to modify 
an accounting framework that shows company profits to be attributable to shareholders alone (see 
IAS 1 – Presentation of Financial Statements, para. 82 (International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2004)). The result is that the report appears to move away from a purely (Freeman-like) 
stakeholder approach as the directors are accountable to shareholders, and responsible (but not 
accountable) to other stakeholders - it seems that the good corporate governance principle of 
accountability is only applicable to shareholders6. 
 
This analysis of the inclusive approach is supported by Rossouw’s (2005) description of the 
inclusive model of corporate governance evident across Africa as one “in which boards of 
directors are not merely accountable to shareholders but also responsible to other stakeholders of 
the company” (p.97). Note that the distinction between being accountable to the company and 
being accountable to shareholders has become blurred. It seems then that in some regard the 




2. Justification for the inclusive approach 
 
The inclusive approach of King II is justified on several grounds: 
 
 By appeal to improved economic efficiency for the company:  
 
“A company is likely to experience indirect economic benefits such as improved productivity and 
corporate reputation by taking [social responsibility] factors into consideration” (Introduction, 
para. 18.7). 
 
 By appeal to current socio-economic conditions in South Africa: 
 
“… companies in South Africa must recognize that they co-exist in an environment where many 
of the country’s citizens disturbingly remain on the fringes of society’s economic benefits” 
(Introduction, para. 36). 
 
 By appeal to traditional African values. The report (Introduction, para. 38) mentions a 
number of values considered to be characteristic of the African worldview and culture, 
including co-existence, collectiveness and consensus. The exclusion of stakeholders in 
decision-making would seem to run contrary to these principles. 
 
In a similar fashion the section on Integrated Sustainability Reporting supports its 
recommendations by appealing to African values (Chapter 1, para. 8), the financial consequences 
of non-financial issues (Chapter 2, para. 7), the principle of accountability to shareholders as 
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paramount (Chapter 2, para. 2), and the “moral obligation for directors to take care of the 
interests of investors and other stakeholders” (Chapter 3, para. 15). The evidence is clearly 
mixed, and there is support for both the instrumental and normative stakeholder approaches in the 
report. It would be erroneous however to classify King II as based entirely on either instrumental 





King II has been commended as being ‘world class’ for its emphasis on social, environmental and 
ethical concerns (KPMG, in Rossouw, 2002, p.409; Barrier, 2003), referring in particular to the 
Integrated Sustainability Reporting section. However, as is typically the case in corporate 
governance reports, (and with the exception of certain disclosures required by the Employment 
Equity Act), all such reporting is voluntary and South African companies have tended to lag 
behind when it comes to social and environmental reporting. KPMG’s Integrated Sustainability 
Reporting in South Africa 2003 survey revealed that while more and more companies are 
providing some disclosure on sustainability-related issues, much of this disclosure is only 
superficial and general in nature (p.2). It also notes (p.2) that 20% of the companies surveyed 
from the JSE Securities Exchange produced a stand-alone non-financial report compared to 45% 
of the Global Fortune 250 companies7. The more recent KPMG International Survey of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2005 paints a more promising picture, noting that since 2002 
reporting in this area by South African companies has improved, and “South Africa is not lagging 




It is also apparent that the same thinking that underlies corporate governance reforms in the UK 
and US (Friedman’s approach) underlies much of the thinking in the South African corporate 
environment. Despite the legal setup, the owners of corporations are identified with shareholders 
in the financial media, and there has been no real stakeholder ‘turn’ in much corporate activity 
since the release of either King I or King II. Financial accounting practices are also no different 
to those in Western countries (they have even drawn closer over the last decade). The fact that in 
many cases companies can continue ‘business as usual’, albeit with some added non-financial 
reporting and additional committee structures, suggests that the stakeholder approach initially so 
evident in King II is accompanied by an implicit acceptance of existing shareholder-dominant 
structures. 
 
It would be inappropriate not to mention that some effort was made in King II to acknowledge 
the African context. As mentioned above, the introduction closes with a list of certain aspects of 
African culture and values taken from an article by Shepherd Shonhiwa – a Fellow and Vice-
Chairperson of the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa. These include, amongst others, 
collectiveness, an inclination towards consensus, humility and helpfulness and co-existence with 
others (para. 38). However, the fact that the introduction to the report opens with a quote from 
Adrian Cadbury (from the UK) and closes with a brief consideration of the African context, 
which appears to be little more than a postscript, as well as the attribution of the African values to 
an external source, suggests that the report’s writers consider the African context to be secondary 
to the global context. There is little consideration then of what corporate governance in South 
Africa should look like from a South African viewpoint and the impact on corporate governance 
 16




SOUTH AFRICAN CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The following section considers certain issues that are specifically relevant to South African 
society and which may consequently have an impact on forms of corporate governance. Certain 
aspects of African culture and society are considered, followed by issues of social and economic 
development. 
 
South Africa’s people and cultures are diverse (to begin with, there are 11 official languages) and 
it is not possible to identify one single ‘South African’ culture. Nevertheless, since the country 
became a genuine democracy in 1994, and the African National Congress came to power, there 
has been a clear encouragement of ‘Africanness’ - an affirmation of what had up until then been 
denied, and more recently with Thabo Mbeki and the ‘African Renaissance’ project, a 
determination to build a country on Afro-centric rather than Euro-centric principles. 
Consequently, the philosophy and values discussed below are drawn from writings on ‘black’ 
African peoples and culture8. 
 
 
Person and community 
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Traditional African society is generally agreed to be communitarian in nature (Gyekye, 2003; 
Wiredu, 2003; Mbiti, 1989; Menkiti, 1979). Gyekye (2003, p.298) notes that this is sometimes 
seen as the defining characteristic of African cultures, and illustrates how post-independence 
African leaders such as Leopold Senghor, Joseph Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah 
have both confirmed the communitarian nature of society and used it to justify socialist forms of 
government – as Senghor stated in 1964: 
 
“Negro-African society puts more stress on the group than on the individuals, more on solidarity than on 
the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion of persons than on their autonomy. Ours 
is a community society” (in Gyekye, 2003, p.298). 
 
Gyekye (2003) distinguishes between a radical or unrestricted communitarianism that supports 
the ontological primacy of the community over the individual to the extent that individual 
personhood is granted by and can be withheld by the community, and a moderate 
communitarianism in which the dual nature of individuals is acknowledged: “as a communal 
being and as an autonomous, self-determining, self-assertive being with a capacity for evaluation 
and choice” (p.306). Whichever view is taken, it is apparent that when compared to Western, or 
Anglo-American societies, African societies have traditionally given much more weight to the 
rights and interests of the community than the rights and interests of the individual. 
 
In South Africa, the importance of the community is evident in the common philosophy of 
‘ubuntu’. The term can be loosely translated as ‘I am because you are’ or “I am, because we are; 
and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1989, p.110). This principle of reciprocity and 
interdependence is often invoked as an everyday moral principle to encourage members of 
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society to ‘love thy neighbour’. Chinkada (in Prinsloo, 2000, p.276) regards ‘ubuntu’ as a form of 
African humanism that includes “alms-giving, being sympathetic, caring, sensitive to the needs 
of others, being respectful, considerate, patient and kind”. Prinsloo (2000) illustrates how 
‘ubuntu’ can be expressed as ‘participative management’ and can even be used as a business 
management technique. Despite the wide (and almost fashionable) use of the term, the ‘ubuntu’ 
principle reflects the communitarian nature of South African society at a basic level. 
 
The implications for corporate governance in Africa lie in the effect that this has on the choice of 
an appropriate model. The Anglo-American corporate environment, and shareholder and 
instrumental stakeholder theory rely on the primacy of individuals’ rights to private property. 
Such a model would then be inappropriate in a society that traditionally holds communal rights at 
least equal in value to, if not greater than individual rights9. 
 
Following from the communitarian nature of African society, it is argued that duties take 
precedence over rights (Gyekye, 2003; Menkiti, 1979). Gyekye believes that this priority of 
duties over rights is evident from the ‘natural sociality’ of the person – the fact that each person is 
born into relation with others. This is obviously not unique to African societies, but he believes 
that the fundamental awareness of others within communitarian ethics will then “obliterate the 
distinction between duties and so-called supererogatory acts or acts of charity, and consider all of 
them as our moral duties” (p.310). In this viewpoint altruism is morally obligatory. Despite the 
practical difficulties of implementation and possible conflict with common moral sense it can still 
be held as a desirable normative moral principle (similar to some religious prescriptions). Menkiti 
(1979) makes no connections with altruism but argues that at a basic level Western societies are 
organised around the rights of individuals and African societies are organised around the 
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requirements of duty: “In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties which 
individuals owe to the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary 
to the exercise of their duties” (p.167). This is an ethic that is inconsistent with the existence of 
corporations which seek to further only their owners’ interests (duties only to shareholders) or 
which take cognisance of the community in the course of furthering only their owners’ interests. 
 
 
Decision-making by consensus 
 
Letza et al. (2004) note that four forms of governance can be identified: hierarchies, the market, 
clans or communities and associations. While attention is usually given to the first two, the latter 
two “may offer more value in corporate governance in non-Anglo cultures” (p.257).  
 
Traditional African models of governance are often characterised by their mode of decision-
making by consensus (Wiredu, 1997; Nash 2002). Matters affecting the community would be 
discussed by everybody concerned, each man was allowed a say, and the proceedings would 
continue until the eventual course of action was supported unanimously (Nash, p.245). The leader 
acted more as a facilitator than decision-maker, who ultimately brought together the views of the 
community. Underlying this process is the principle of respect for each individual and his 
viewpoint and the end result is a community that proceeds without division. While this represents 
a ‘traditional’ view of African governance (which may or may not actually correspond to the 
historical record), some aspects can be seen in modern South Africa (some aspects, such as the 
exclusion of women, are clearly not condoned). Nelson Mandela records how: 
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“as a leader, I have always followed the principles I first saw demonstrated by the regent at the Great 
Palace. I have always endeavoured to listen to what each and every person in a discussion had to say 
before venturing my own opinion. Oftentimes, my own opinion will simply represent a consensus of what 
I heard in the discussion.” (quoted in Nash, 2002, p.245). 
 
Nash goes on to show how this role of the leader in representing the differing views of the people 
to come to a consensus is evident in the ANC’s apparent “shifting” economic policies (Socialism 
vs Capitalism) as well as in the political negotiations that led to a peaceful democratic South 
Africa in 1994. It could perhaps also shed light on the ANC’s current policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
towards neighbouring Zimbabwe.  
 
Wiredu (1997) regards reconciliation and dialogue to be two defining characteristics of 
consensual governance, characteristics that stand in contrast to the adversarial relationships that 
characterise corporate decision-making in many Western countries. In comparison with the 
traditional African structures that encourage dialogue and consensus, decision-making in the 
Anglo-American model is typically performed by directors who take shareholder interests to be 
the overriding concern (although management’s interests appear to rank highly) with 
consideration been paid to other stakeholder interests where they can enhance shareholder wealth 
or for legitimacy and image management.  
 
 
Social justice and development 
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With widespread poverty and unemployment in the region of 40%, reducing hardship and 
meeting the basic economic needs of South Africans is arguably the top priority of the ANC. The 
ANC’s recent election campaign slogan is “a better life for all”, reflecting the concern of many, if 
not most South Africans regarding unemployment, housing shortages, access to education and 
healthcare, issues that for most of the population received little attention before 1994. With the 
implementation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 and the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act of 2003 the government actively intervenes in the economy to achieve some 
form of economic equality. Much of the rhetoric of the ANC, and the justification for its policies 
is based on the need to ‘redress past wrongs’ and correct the imbalances and structural faults 
inherited from apartheid and colonialism.  
 
Ya-Mona (2003) draws on a moral imperative and talks about restoring the primacy of the ethical 
order over the economic order in the wider African context, with the first responsibility for 
economic action being 
 
“the search for well-being on a goods level necessary for people’s subsistence and development; all in all, 
to serve people … following the moral decadence caused … by the ever-increasing importance of the 
powers of money and individualism”(2003, p.336).  
 
This corresponds well with the communitarian nature of traditional African society and the 
emphasis on duties over rights. 
 
In this context one can then ask what the role of the corporation is and what it should be, with 
respect to issues of social justice, economic equality and development. Reed (2002, p.238) 
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identifies strong and weak forms of responsibility towards economic development. In the strong 
form the corporation’s raison d’etre is to promote development and in the weak form promoting 
development is seen as a requirement to be fulfilled in order to be ‘allowed’ to conduct business. 
Considering the context outlined above it seems that a strong form of responsibility would be 
expected of corporations in South Africa. Ya-Mona (2003, p.336) suggests, for instance, that 
before a new product is produced, the corporation should at first consider whether or not the 
product meets people’s legitimate needs and whether it “contributes to making a person more of a 
person” (referring to the material well-being necessary for subsistence and humanistic self-
development) rather than whether or not it will sell and be profitable.  
 
The reality is that the existing corporate environment in South Africa, even taking King II’s 
‘inclusive’ approach into consideration, does not incorporate such moral imperatives but rather 
promotes the profit motive, and that at best, South African corporations adopt a weak form of 
responsibility towards development. As Reed (2002) has noted though, many developing 
countries have adopted the Anglo-American model as a strategy to attract investment and as a 
means towards greater economic development and goes on to regard “the Anglo-American model 
… [as] a logical micro level complement of the macro neo-liberal global economy” (p.231). 
South Africa has followed suit: King II notes that “if there is a lack of good corporate governance 
in a market, capital will leave that market with the click of a mouse” (Introduction, para. 16). In 
as far as this strategy may meet the development needs of South Africa it may be appropriate; 
however, one may wonder how effective this strategy will prove to be:  
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“where are the continuing success stories of liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, sound money and 
balanced budgets? Where are the emerging markets that have emerged, the developing countries that have 
developed … They do not exist.” (Galbraith, in Marais, 2002, p.90). 
 
A macroeconomic strategy which relies on the ‘trickle-down’ effect of free-market capitalism to 
meet developmental goals is at odds with an ethics that insists on urgent human needs taking 





There is an incompatibility between the aspects of African culture identified above and the 
Anglo-American corporate environment. The emphasis on communal rights conflicts with the 
individual right to private property that is fundamental in Anglo-American models; the insistence 
on consensus in decision-making conflicts with corporate structures where directors are 
appointed by only one party (shareholders), and whose interests are typically elevated above 
those of other stakeholders; and the urgent needs for social justice and redress of inequalities 
conflicts with an economic system in which development needs are a hoped-for long-term 
consequence of the immediate pursuit of profit and efficiency. 
 
South Africa’s corporate environment differs in some respects to the Anglo-American approach. 
The state intervenes in the labour market (through the Employment Equity Act) and the capital 
market (through the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act), and King II departs from 
the shareholder model of corporate governance to present a stakeholder model, incorporating 
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elements of both instrumental and normative stakeholder theory. While from the perspective of 
Western corporate governance regimes this departure is significant, even radical, it is important 
to recall that there is theoretical room for a stakeholder approach that is justified on purely 
normative grounds. South Africa’s corporate environment can be described as modified Anglo-
American (predominantly shareholder oriented, yet incorporating elements of both instrumental 
and normative stakeholder theories), and can be contrasted with the aspects of African culture 
outlined above which insist upon a normative stakeholder approach. As noted earlier, the 
difference between instrumental and normative stakeholder theories is more critical from an 
ethical perspective than the difference between shareholder and instrumental stakeholder theories. 
It is the former difference that characterises the incompatibility of the current South African 
corporate environment with the African values outlined above.  
 
Against the backdrop of African communitarian values that amount to a depiction of ‘the good 
life’, the current South African corporate environment can be regarded as morally wrong, and 
deserving of moral sanction. This is not the sole preserve of the cultural relativist - a universalist 
that supports global economic exchange and growth as morally right may accept different 
corporate practices as examples of cultural diversity that do not conflict with the overriding ethic, 
and he/she may regard corporate practices that do not resonate with local cultural values as 
immoral (particularly where they resemble forms of colonialism/imperialism). It could, however, 
be suggested that, following a consequentialist ethic, maintenance of the Anglo-American model 
could promote African values without actually honouring them. For that to be true the Anglo-
American model would have to in some way actually promote the African values in question. 
Supporting economic growth is not equivalent to promoting African values, so it is difficult to 
see how this view could resolve the incompatibility. 
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A practical example of the potential consequences can be seen through an interpretation of the 
events in Zimbabwe over recent years, which regards the controversial land redistribution 
program as the triumph of communal values (relating to transgressions that occurred in previous 
generations) and the urgent need to redress a glaring inequality (the unequal distribution of land 
ownership) over rights to individual private property (See Ramose, 2003; Mandaza, 199910). 
There have been warnings over similar ‘land grabs’ taking place in South Africa, and although 
this currently appears unlikely, the Zimbabwe case provides an example of the realities of 
conflict between African and Western values, a conflict that in that case was unforeseen by many. 
 
The incompatibility between African values and the South Africa corporate environment must 
then be resolved. It is anticipated that this can occur through change in the African values, change 
in the South African corporate environment, or change in both. Some prospects and possibilities 
for change in these areas are now considered. 
 
Prospects for African values 
A number of criticisms can be raised which question the exposition of African values above. 
Firstly, in an era of increased globalisation, society in South African society increasingly takes on 
the values of other cultures, particularly those of the USA. Secondly, the African values 
mentioned may refer to a romanticised, traditional African society that has never existed. Thirdly, 
this view of African values ignores the importance and influence of different groups within South 
Africa (such as Afrikaners, English-speaking whites, other Europeans and Indians; and rural 
versus urban communities) and the increased integration that has taken place (and continues to 
take place) since the end of apartheid. Fourthly, the experiences of ruthless and corrupt 
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dictatorships in other parts of Africa, and lastly, the existence of a new ‘black elite’ that has 
benefited from a Black Economic Empowerment that has frequently failed in its attempts at being 
‘Broad-Based’, and that shows no more evidence of communitarian African values than white 
business leaders. All of these suggest that the African values outlined above are not apparent in 
South African society and that there is in fact no incompatibility between the South African 
corporate environment and South African values.  
 
There is, however, evidence that these values are maintained and/or encouraged. The African 
Renaissance project specifically encourages a ‘return’ to African culture and incorporates a 
determination to build structures on Afro-centric principles rather than turning to Europe or 
America for direction; the associated ‘rediscovery’ of traditional cultures and practices in the 
wake of a globalisation dominated by American culture (not limited to Africa of course); the 
continued rhetoric regarding social justice and ‘redressing’ past wrongs; the increased awareness 
of ‘ubuntu’ in recent years (the first doctorate on the subject was completed in 1997 (Broodryk, 
1997), and the concept itself is now familiar to non-black South Africans); and the example of 
neighbouring Zimbabwe, together with threats of similar action (however unlikely) being made 
in Namibia and South Africa. 
 
It can be argued that if the African values described earlier are not at all widely held, then 
postulating different, more commonly-held values may partially resolve the incompatibility 
(although the urgency of social justice concerns cannot be easily dismissed; consider, for 
example, Mbeki’s (1998) depiction of two separate economies – one mostly white and rich, and 
one mostly black and poor, as well as recent civil unrest over the slow pace of delivery of basic 
services such as housing and sanitation). Without empirical evidence it is impossible to conclude 
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on whether the African values are in fact widely held and consequently this represents an 
important area of further research. Despite the lack of empirical support, the extremes - that the 
African values outlined above are held throughout South Africa, or that they are not held 
throughout South Africa - are highly unlikely, and the incompatibility between African values 
and the South African corporate environment cannot be summarily rejected by claiming that the 
African values are not at all held. 
 
Assuming then that African values are held to at least some significant degree, it is also unlikely 
that African values will change to the point where the incompatibility with the current South 
African corporate environment is completely removed. Calls for such change would undoubtedly 
be viewed as attempts at cultural colonialism and would run contrary to the efforts at an African 
Renaissance. At the same time, a strict interpretation of African values cannot be maintained: the 
economic (not to mention political and humanitarian) effects of the land redistribution program in 
Zimbabwe have been devastating. Some change is necessary and could for example include a 
rejection of radical / unrestricted communitarianism in favour of moderate communitarianism, 
widespread public acceptance of individual rights to private property, and relinquishing ancestral 
claims based on transgressions that took place in the colonial or apartheid eras (the more recent 
the transgression the more radical the change). All of which would go some way to reducing the 
incompatibility of the corporate environment with African values.  
 
 
Prospects for corporate structures 
In a similar vein to the above, it is inconceivable to expect changes in the South African 
corporate environment that would completely remove its incompatibility with African values. 
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Some change in the existing corporate environment is nevertheless necessary; specifically change 
towards stronger normative foundations. Considerations of how this may be achieved with regard 
to attitudes and awareness, corporate structures, and corporate practices are outlined below: 
 
 Attitudes and awareness. A far greater awareness and publicisation of normative 
stakeholder theory amongst business practitioners, the business media and the general 
public must take place. King II rejected the ‘traditional shareowner dominant view’, and, as 
noted above, different models of corporate governance draw on differing views of the 
corporation. The stakeholder view (particularly its normative aspects) is not apparent in the 
business media, and is not adequately taught in business education (especially where 
American or British textbooks are used, even where they are published as South African 
editions). Educators should bear some of the responsibility to ensure that normative 
stakeholder concerns, and the associated attitudes towards business, are embedded 
throughout business education. Instead of being restricted to discussions on corporate social 
responsibility and business ethics they should be incorporated throughout discussions of 
goal-setting, leadership, organisational behaviour, human resource management and 
financial management. 
 
An example of a specific area in which increased awareness both of normative stakeholder 
arguments and the South African environment is necessary is in the moral implications of 
the directors’ responsibility to the company (not necessarily the shareholders), also 
emphasised in King II. Goodpaster (1991) refers to the moral dilemma that occurs where 
management has a moral obligation to consider all of its stakeholders as well as a 
conflicting moral obligation in the form of its fiduciary duty to shareholders as the 
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‘stakeholder paradox’. He resolves the paradox by arguing that management’s 
responsibilities to its stakeholders (other than shareholders) are not fiduciary 
responsibilities, but rank alongside other general human moral obligations. However, as the 
common law fiduciary duty of directors is towards the company, there is not necessarily 
any paradox in maintaining moral obligations to both the company and to all of its 
stakeholders. (This does not remove the practical difficulties associated with deciding 
which stakeholder’s interests take precedence at any particular time). The company’s 
objectives are not necessarily identical with those of its shareholders, although the most 
obvious and immediate objective for any company is survival, which requires that 
sustainable profit-making activity is necessary. However a glance at company annual 
reports reveals that they proudly subscribe to other objectives such as providing quality 
products and services, providing a safe environment for employees and participating in the 
local community as a responsible citizen. Directors are then morally permitted, and no 
doubt on some occasions morally obliged, to sacrifice some economic wealth in the 
achievement of another objective.  
 
 
 Corporate structures. Corporations, as more than the sum of the individuals involved, and 
with clear statements of mission and values, are in some ways already aligned to a 
communitarian outlook. Changes in legal and regulatory structures would however be 
necessary where the existing structures reinforce values that are incompatible with the 
African values discussed above. The length of time that it may take to make legal and/or 
regulatory changes does not negate this and the opportunity should be taken to begin the 
discourse over ways in which structures could be altered to better suit South African values 
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and concerns. Issues to consider include the adoption and adherence to international 
accounting pronouncements and the lack of any framework for reporting to stakeholders 
other than shareholders, the appointment of decision-makers (directors) by shareholders 
only, and the uncritical adoption of the single-tiered board as the optimum decision-making 
structure. Consideration of corporate structures from non-Anglo-American countries (such 
as Germany and Japan) may also prove informative. 
 
A common response to any proposed moves away from Anglo-American corporate 
structures is that they would alienate international investment and reduce international 
competitiveness, which would be detrimental to current attempts at reducing poverty and 
unemployment and undermine long-term economic growth. While the likely effects on 
international investment should undoubtedly be considered, the modifications to the Anglo-
American model that have already occurred (the Employment Equity Act, the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act, and elements of King II) have not met with significant 
resistance or condemnation internationally11 and it would be premature to assume that all 
legal or regulatory changes would have disastrous consequences.  
 
 
 Corporate practices. There have been periodic attempts to incorporate African values into 
management practices in South Africa (Prinsloo, 2000; Christie et al., 1993; McFarlin et 
al., 1999; Mbigi and Maree, 1995). However, alignment with African values requires that 
these approaches to management become mainstream rather than alternative thinking. 
Links should then be drawn between African managerial approaches and aspects of 
management thinking in other parts of the world. Khoza (1993) acknowledged the 
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problems of adopting a Euro-centric approach to business in South Africa and referred to 
the ‘community concept’ of a business which emphasises communal values over individual 
competitiveness and advocated business principles that are “essentially humanistic and 
humane and [which] should permeate the whole outlook on business methods and 
practices” (p.122). He has emphasised values of “creative cooperation, empathetic 
communication and team work” (p.123) and identified three implications from the 
‘community concept’ of management (p.124):  
 
o “a sound basis for team learning [that] would help to eliminate Eurocentric blind 
spots … which often degenerates into reckless individualism…”; 
o  “a greater sense of oneness within the corporations, thereby contributing towards 
changing the traditional adversarial relationship between managers and the 
managed into a consensual one”; and 
o  “corporate responsibility programmes [that] should be more natural”. 
 
The fact that Christie et al.’s African Management is now out of print indicates, however, 
how marginal these views remain. 
 
There are also possibilities for accounting in a ‘community concept’ of business that should 
be developed. Financial and sustainability reporting then becomes a means of ongoing 
communication with all stakeholders rather than an annual exercise in compliance or a 
means of enhancing legitimacy. Instead of general purpose financial statements and the 
corporate sustainability report that attempt to accommodate a wide range of stakeholder 
interests, more specific financial and sustainability reports could be directed at stakeholder 
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groups as part of the ongoing dialogue and reconciliation process characteristic of 
management through consensus.  
 
There is at the same time an obvious global trend towards increased quantity and quality of 
social and environmental reporting (such as through the ‘triple-bottom line’, the Global 
Reporting Initiative and AccountAbility 1000), a trend that is followed by large listed 
South African companies, although as noted earlier, South African companies have tended 
to lag behind. Research in this area has sought to explain social and environmental 
reporting through Legitimacy theory, Stakeholder theory and Political Economy theory 
(Deegan, 2000) and normative stakeholder concerns do not appear to be dominant 
motivations for most businesses (Deegan, 2002). Although social and environmental 
reporting undoubtedly remains relevant in South Africa in its reflection of stakeholder 
concerns, possible amendments to financial reporting that would be more ‘stakeholder-
neutral’ could include reporting directly to stakeholders in the annual report (not only to 
shareholders), including the audit report; rewording the ‘profit attributable to shareholders’ 
to indicate company profits, or profits attributable to all stakeholders, and including the cost 




These measures would relieve some of the tension between African values and the South African 
corporate environment and represent a move towards the entrenchment and application of 






There has been no economic watershed in South Africa which compares to the 1994 nonracial 
elections and the political changes that have created a democratic, politically equal society. While 
corporate structures resemble those in Anglo-American jurisdictions, there are aspects of the 
South African corporate environment that suggest a more ‘inclusive’ approach than is typical in 
the UK or USA. This article has provided an analysis and critique of corporate governance in 
post-apartheid South Africa, with particular emphasis on the values implicit in the approach. 
 
The result is the identification of an incompatibility between a given exposition of African values 
and the values implicit in the current South African corporate environment. The degree of the 
incompatibility is admittedly subject to the validity of the African values as espoused by a 
number of African intellectuals. Assuming that these are at least partly held, and are to some 
extent encouraged, a moral dilemma is presented. Admitting cultural relativism, or cultural 
diversity within a universalist ethical framework, suggests that a society’s values be mirrored and 
best expressed in institutions that are consistent with those values. The South African corporate 
environment can be described as a modified form of the Anglo-American model (modified by 
some attempts to incorporate stakeholder theory, notably in King II), with its prominence given 
to shareholders and the consistent primacy of economic objectives. This stands in contrast to the 
normative prescriptions from African intellectuals who espouse communitarian values including 
communal rights, consensual decision-making and a priority of ethical over economic concerns.  
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In a South Africa which is still recovering from colonial and apartheid values, which exists on a 
continent which has ample examples of failed attempts at African socialism, and which is trying 
to attract international investment (often from Anglo-American countries), exactly how a truly 
South African corporate environment should develop remains a difficult question to answer. The 
theoretical analysis presented sheds light on how this may be achieved: it is suggested that some 
compromise in the African values (as far as these are held) is necessary, particularly the more 
radical elements – radical communitarianism and the precedence of communal/ancestral property 
rights;  concerning the corporate environment it is suggested that normative stakeholder concerns 
need to be further entrenched in business, through increased awareness of normative stakeholder 
theory and its implications, changes in corporate structures (at the very least, discourse on how 
these may or may not be appropriate) and change in corporate practices such as management 




1 At March 2005, black-controlled companies represented only 4% of the market capitalisation of 
the JSE Securities Exchange, down from a high of 7% in November 1998 (BusinessMap 
Foundation, 2005). Empowerdex (2002) calculated black ownership of the top 115 listed 
companies at 9.62% of their market capitalization in June 2002 and BusinessMap Foundation 
(2003) estimated black ownership at between 12.36% and 14.57% overall at September 2002. 
 
2  In 2005 eight conglomerates owned 51.3% of the JSE Securities Exchange (Who Own’s Whom 
(Pty) Ltd, 2005). 
 
3  The Employment Equity Act of 1998 requires designated employers to 
 
“ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from designated groups 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; and … retain and develop 
people from designated groups …” (Section 15(2)) 
 
The measures referred to include preferential treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas 
(Section 15(3)). Designated employers are required to consult with employees, conduct an 
analysis, prepare an employment equity plan and report on progress made in implementing the 
plan.  
 
Designated groups include black people, women and people with disabilities. ‘Black’ includes 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians. Designated employers include a person who employs 50 or 
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more employees and a person employing less than 50 employees but whose annual turnover 
exceeds a predetermined amount (ranging from R2 million to R25 million). 
  
4  According to the Act, ‘black’ is defined to include Africans, Indians and Coloureds. 
 
5  The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 includes in its objectives the 
promotion of economic transformation to “enable meaningful participation of black people in the 
economy” (Section 2(a)). 
 
This objective is achieved through establishing criteria for the granting of licences and 
concessions, for preferential procurement policies for government and the public sector, for the 
sale of state-owned enterprises and the establishment of public-private partnerships (Cliffe 
Dekker, 2004). The criteria include measures of direct empowerment (ownership and 
management), indirect empowerment (preferential procurement and enterprise development) and 
human resource development (employment equity and skills development). Industry-specific 
charters provide ‘scorecards’ for measuring progress as well as industry goals in each of these 
areas. See Cliffe Dekker Attorneys’ The Way to BEE (2004) for further information. 
 
6  One can also wonder how good the responsibility to stakeholders can be without the need to be 
accountable. Is it really possible for stakeholders to hold management to account where they are 
not given the information to inform them of any relevant problems?  
 
7  It should be mentioned that King II does recognise that while South Africa is ranked highly 
among emerging markets for corporate governance, it is ranked low for disclosure and 
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transparency (Introduction, para. 15), and that the “minimalist approach to corporate governance 
adopted by many local companies needs to change” (Introduction, para. 15). 
 
8  The writings of a number of non-South African, African intellectuals are drawn upon for two 
reasons: Firstly, in recent decades South African intellectuals have been primarily concerned with 
and informed by the anti-apartheid struggle (for instance, Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness), 
and the issues raised here have not all been written on extensively. Secondly, although there are a 
multitude of African cultures, there are also certain commonalities amongst sub-Saharan African 
peoples; it is submitted that the aspects of African society discussed here are broadly 
representative of these peoples, in the same way that one talks of ‘Western’, or ‘European’ 
values. 
 
9  See Etzioni (1998) for a discussion of how communitarianism can inform stakeholder theory. 
 
10  With specific reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe, Ramose (2003, p.471) talks of land 
rights belonging to ‘peoples’ and argues that “Memory evokes the old truth that the land and 
sovereignty over it belong to the indigenous conquered peoples … Awareness of this truth 
impelled them to seek justice in the form of the reversion of title to territory to its rightful holders 
– the indigenous conquered peoples” and regards property rights that are based on ‘conquest’ or 
‘discovery’ as unsustainable in law. Mandaza (1999) acknowledges Mugabe’s political reasons 
for the land redistribution program but also notes (p.81) that “[reconciliation] is both an ideology 
and a policy that becomes increasingly untenable as the social demands of the mass of the people 





11 Ernst & Young’s (2006) survey of the attitudes of foreign-owned multi-nationals revealed that 
35% felt that the impact of BEE on investment would be negative and 35% felt it would be 
positive. The survey also notes that the lower the understanding of BEE by the parent company, 
the greater the negative perception. See The Soul of Dell (Dell, 2003) for an example of how one 
multi-national has embraced Employment Equity, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
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